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1. Introduction
On November 1, 2009 Reuters magazine reported that CIT Group Inc. filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy. CIT Group was a storied lender to individual and businesses but because of the
global financial crisis it was unable to sustain itself. As people began to default on their loans
through the crisis, the $2.3 billion CIT Group had received through the Troubled Asset Relief
Plan proved incapable of keeping them afloat. If CIT Group could not emerge from bankruptcy it
would further damage the shrinking available credit market for small businesses. Armed with a
prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy plan, CIT Group entered bankruptcy aiming to reduce
its total debt by $10 billion. They planned to achieve this by transferring ownership to their
creditors and reducing the face value of bond issued debt by 30%. Just 38 days after filing, CIT
Group successfully emerged from bankruptcy by eliminating $10.5 billion worth of debt.
The case of CIT Group raises some interesting questions about the emergence of a
financial firm from bankruptcy. What was it about CIT Group that made it able to emerge from
Chapter 11 when so many other financial institutions have failed to do so? What was it that made
CIT Group able to emerge in a post-financial crisis climate? In this paper, I study the
characteristics that allow firms to emerge from bankruptcy. In addition, this study also addresses
if certain characteristics are related to bankruptcy emergence depending on whether a firm filed
bankruptcy before or after the financial crisis. Ultimately, using variables that have been found to
be significant in prior research, I find that, before the financial crisis, firms who spent less time in
bankruptcy and firms who replaced their CEO during the bankruptcy process were more likely to
emerge from Chapter 11. I also find that no firm-specific variable that I observed was
significantly related to bankruptcy emergence in a post-financial crisis climate.
This paper adds to existing research in this subject area by looking at bankruptcy
emergence through the lens of the 2008 crisis. Currently, to the best of my knowledge, the only
research that exists, relative to changes in bankruptcy-related variables caused by a shift in the
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greater financial climate, focuses on firm-specific variables’ relationship with the probability of
filing bankruptcy in the future. This study differs by exploring changes that may occur in the
relationship of firm-specific variables and bankruptcy emergence, rather than bankruptcy filing,
relative to shifts in the financial climate. There has been research associated with bankruptcy
emergence indicators; however, no research to the best of my knowledge that focuses on shifts in
emergence indicators from different time periods.
I discuss these topics by first outlining bankruptcy mechanics in the United States in
section 2 with an emphasis on Chapter 11 filings. In section 3, I then go on to discuss the causes
and effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Section 4 primarily summarizes prior research in the areas
of bankruptcy, bankruptcy emergence, and the financial crisis. Using these findings, I formally
state my hypotheses about bankruptcy emergence indicators at the end of this section. A brief
description of the data set can be found in section 5, alongside a description of the analysis
methodology. This is directly followed by section 6 which states the results of the statistical
analysis procedures. I then conclude the paper in section 7 with a discussion of my findings and
areas for future research.
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2. Bankruptcy Mechanics
The following information was found on the website of the United States Courts,
www.uscourts.gov, and the United States Justice Department, www.justice.gov.
2.1 Background
Bankruptcy is the legal process in which a business or individual recognizes their
inability to repay their outstanding debt. It is a mutually beneficial process for both the bankrupt
party—the debtor—and the holders of their outstanding debt—the creditors. The process presents
debtors with the opportunity to reset their financial situation by eliminating or restructuring their
current debt obligations, while at the same time also providing the creditors with some form of
repayment. Upon resolution, the debtor is forgiven certain debt obligations and is free to seek out
credit again.
In the United States, bankruptcy filings vary greatly between cases. The first variation
stems from the originator of the bankruptcy petition. If the bankruptcy petition is filed with the
United States Bankruptcy Court by the debtor, the bankruptcy is considered voluntary. Under a
voluntary bankruptcy, a debtor willingly recognizes their inability to make payments on their
current outstanding debt. This differs from an involuntary bankruptcy which occurs when a
creditor, or a group of creditors, forces a debtor into bankruptcy by filing the bankruptcy petition
against a debtor. Per 11 U.S.C. § 303, a group of three or more creditors can file a Chapter 11 or
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against a debtor if the debt owed to the creditors is unsecured and
the sum of the debt is at least $15,775. If the debtor has less than 12 creditors, then a single
creditor can file a bankruptcy petition against a creditor if the sum of the debt owed to the creditor
is at least $15,775.
The second variation in bankruptcy cases arises from which chapter the petition is filed
under. In the United States, there are six different types of bankruptcy:
Chapter 7 – Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code
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Chapter 9 – Municipality Bankruptcy
Chapter 11 – Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code
Chapter 12 – Family Farmer Bankruptcy or Family Fisherman Bankruptcy
Chapter 13 – Individual Debt Adjustment
Chapter 15 – Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases
The most common bankruptcy filings in the United States are Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and
Chapter 13. For the scope of this paper, I will be focusing on Chapter 11 as this was the only type
of bankruptcy proceeding my sample population went through.
2.2 Chapter 11
A bankruptcy filed under Title 11 Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is
more colloquially known as bankruptcy reorganization. Predominately filed by businesses,
Chapter 11 bankruptcy offers a debtor an attempt to reorganize and restructure their debts while
continuing their operations. While in bankruptcy, a business formulates a plan for reorganization
which is then either accepted or rejected by their creditors and the court.
When a firm files for bankruptcy with their respective judicial district court, a United
States trustee is appointed to the case to represent the United States government. This comes per
the provision of the United States Trustee Program. The United States trustee then appoints a
committee of unsecured creditors who can then participate in conversations pertaining to the
administration of the bankruptcy; investigate the operations and conditions of the debtor in
relevance to the formulation of a plan; and partake in the formulation, acceptance, and rejection
of a plan.
If the courts deem it necessary, a second trustee that holds no interest in the case, and
who is elected by the committee of creditors, may also be appointed to represent the debtor in
possession. If the bankruptcy case includes allegations of misconduct and fraud, then this second
trustee appointment may be the appointment of an examiner who is responsible for investigating
the debtor in possession. The trustee’s or examiner’s responsibilities include filing a schedule of
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debts, investigating the operations of the debtor in possession, filing a plan of reorganization,
operating a debtor’s business, and filing all necessary supplemental documentation such as tax
returns and a disclosure statement.
Subsequently, each party—the debtor possession, the trustee and the committee of
creditors—can file a plan for reorganization. The debtor in possession can file a plan at the time
of their filing or at any time during the case proceedings. This differs from the committee of
creditors who can only file a plan for reorganization 120 days after the approval date of the
bankruptcy petition.
A Chapter 11 bankruptcy has several distinct characteristics. The plan must first
designate all the classes of claims and interests. This refers to classifying creditors in to different
groups such as secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders. The plan then must
provide equal treatment to all creditors within the same class. This refers to a situation where the
plan gives preferential treatment to only one secured creditor and not the others. However, the
plan can prioritize classes; traditionally, the secured creditors are addressed first and equity
holders are handled last. Despite the plan’s ability to prioritize creditors it cannot impair any
creditors’ rightful claim to the debtor’s assets. Ultimately, the plan must be consistent with the
creditors’ best interests.
The purpose of the plan is to specifically depict the methods of implementation that the
debtor will take to reorganize their debt. These methods cover a vast array of reorganization
strategies. The plan must outline the transfer and retention of the debtor’s estate and securities, as
well as the subsequent redistribution of these proceeds among the holders of claims. It must also
give notice to any mergers or consolidations the debtor plans to pursue with any of their holdings.
Any restructuring the debtor plans to make on an outstanding debt obligation must be outlined as
well. Under the provisions of the plan all liens must be satisfied, medicated, or cancelled and all
defaults must be waived or cured.
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Along with the reorganization plan, debtors must also provide the committees and court
with a disclosure statement. The disclosure statement aims to provide adequate information
concerning all the debtor’s financial affairs so that the committees can make an informed decision
about the debtor’s plan. To achieve this, the disclosure statement traditionally contains a brief
history of the debtor along with a description and evaluation of their assets and liabilities. The
statement must also include a comparison analysis of the outcomes of Chapter 11 reorganization
vs. a Chapter 7 liquidation and comprehensive review of all expenses and anticipated expenses
from the bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, some disclosure statements include a
comprehensive risk profile of the debtor.
For the plan to be accepted, it must be approved by all classes of creditors. A class of
creditors accepts the plan if creditors that hold at least two thirds of the amount of all outstanding
claims, or more than half of the total number of creditors, gives approval of the plan. The courts
must also approve the plan based on the plans anticipated feasibility, whether the plan was
constructed in good faith, and if the plan is in compliance with all provisions.
Once the plan is confirmed all previous debt held by the debtor is discharged. The debtor
then takes on the revised debt obligations as outlined in the negotiated contracts under the
approved plan of reorganization. Under the supervision of the trustee the debtor makes the
planned payments as outlined in the reorganization until the plan has been fully executed as the
courts have prescribed.
2.3 Prepackaged and Prearranged Bankruptcy
One variant of the traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy process that is significant for the
scope of this project, is prepackaged and prearranged bankruptcies. Under a prepackaged and
prearranged bankruptcy, the debtor has negotiated and disclosed a reorganization plan that has
been contractually approved by all its creditors prior to the debtor filing bankruptcy.
The significance of this form of bankruptcy is that it drastically reduces the physical
amount of time that a debtor is in bankruptcy proceedings. This greatly diminishes the uncertainty
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and administrative cost that generally accompany a traditional Chapter 11 filing, subsequently
allowing the debtor to sooner implement its reemergence strategy and continue operations as
normal. Cleary these unique characteristics would suggest that prepackaged and prearranged
bankruptcies would be beneficial in emerging from bankruptcy.

3. Financial Crisis
3.1 Background
Starting in late 2008, and continuing through the greater portion of 2009, the largest
financial recession since the Great Depression ravaged the United States’ financial system.
Mortgage defaults skyrocketed to close to 3 million and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell
53.8 percent in 6 months (Saunders and Cornett 25). Many of investment banking’s largest
players filed for bankruptcy or sought out buyers for acquisitions and mergers. The instability
spread from the financial industry across the greater United States economy, hitting American
automotive giants like Ford, Chrysler Group, and General Motors. The collapse of these
institutional financial firms and industrial giants was only alleviated by massive government
bailouts totaling over $700 billion. Despite this large stimulus package the crisis’ impact could be
felt systemically across the United States with unemployment reaching over 10 percent. The crisis
offers many areas for in-depth research but the scope of this section will focus on the root causes
of the crisis, the collapse of the major financial firms, and the impacts and implications of the
crisis on the financial system. For the purposes of this paper, I would like to see how the crisis
impacted a firm’s probability of bankruptcy emergence, and to see if the crisis changed the
relationship between certain firm-specific characteristics and the probability of emergence.
3.2 Before the Collapse

In the years preceding October 2008, the United States saw a rapid expansion in the
economy primarily in the mortgage sector. During these years of high economic growth, low
interest credit was widely available to end-consumers and was fully utilized. This increase in debt
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seeking activity by end consumers created a large demand on financial institutions to supply more
financial products. To meet this influx in demand, financial institutions then leveraged themselves
to dangerous levels so they could expand their offerings to end-consumers. As the financial
institutions sought out ways to exploit this market a new array of synthesized mortgage-backed
security packages emerged (Brummer 2010).
In short, banks could package the mortgages they made and sell their cash flows to large
institutional investors in the form of a mortgage-backed securities. Before these securities were
sold to investors they were rated by credit agencies—often with the highest rating possible. The
institutional investors, who now owned hundreds of mortgages in the form of multiple mortgagebacked securities, would in theory profit as the home owners made their regular mortgage
payments. However, just in case homeowners stopped making payments and defaulted on their
payments, these large institutional investors bought insurance on these mortgage-backed
securities in the form of credit default swaps from large institutional insurers like AIG
International. In a credit default swap, if the regular scheduled payments from the mortgagebacked security stopped occurring because of default, a third-party insurer would pay the regular
scheduled payment instead.
Now this system would have worked and everyone would have profited if it were not for
two key institutional failures. The first failure came from the mortgage issuing banks. With high
demand for mortgages and the ability to move these mortgages off their books through
securitization, banks were incentivized to make mortgages to subprime customers, or those with
bad credit. This practice should not have worked in theory because investors would have been
turned away by the inherit risk involved with these subprime securitized assets; however, a
second institutional failure occurred. The credit rating agencies—who were being paid by the
originating banks of the securities—often gave these subprime securities artificially high ratings.
Under the impression that they were buying less risky securities, investors continued to purchase
mortgage-backed securities from banks and insurers kept insuring these “safe” securities. Then
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interest rates rose and home prices collapsed contrary to all the prevailing credit risk models that
were being used by lending institutions.
As home prices collapsed, subprime borrowers across the country lost their ability to
refinance their mortgages once their adjustable interest rate rose to levels they could not afford.
Consequently, there were widespread defaults. With an increased number of defaults, insurers
had to contractually fulfill their credit default swaps. However, because of the mass contagion of
defaults, insurers could not pay investors and were forced to file bankruptcy. Without the
insurance payments, investors now had hundreds of worthless investments on their books and
were also forced to file bankruptcy or look for an acquisition. The banks who were continuing to
package these securities were left with no one to sell to and were now forced to keep these bad
loans on their own books eventually leading to their own collapse.
3.2 The Collapse of the Firms and the Market
In an economy, it is natural for some firms to fail while others succeed, as well as for the
more profitable firms to acquire and merge with their less successful competitors. However, in
the case of the financial crisis, the systematic failure of a multitude of financial firms, some of
which were the largest in the country, caused an irreversible economic downturn.
As people began to default on their mortgages in 2007, the financial institutions that had
mainly comprised their portfolios with these subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities
found themselves writing off billions in losses. Per Saunders and Cornett, “Citigroup, Merrill
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley wrote off a combined $40 billon, due mainly to bad mortgage loans.
Bank of America took a $3 billion write-off for bad loans in just the fourth quarter of 2007 while
Wachovia wrote off $1.2 billion. UBS Securities took a loss of $10 billion, Morgan Stanley wrote
off $9.4 billion, Merrill Lynch wrote down $5 billion, and Lehman Brothers took a loss of $52
million” (25).
The effects were not only capped at financial losses but transcended to institutional
failures. Countrywide Financial and IndyMac Bank, both of whom were in the top ten of the
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United States’ largest mortgage issuers, both required bailouts from third parties. Seeing no
improvement after utilizing the full amount of their emergency lines of credit for capital
injections, Countrywide Financial was acquired by Bank of America to mitigate the risk of their
failure causing a ripple effect throughout the market. Similarly, IndyMac required a $9 billion
bailout by the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation after their depositors withdrew over $1.3
billion.
The tipping point came shortly after when the Federal Reserve had to get involved in the
fall of 2008. First, the Federal Reserve organized the merger between J.P. Morgan Chase and
Bear Stearns, the fifth largest bank in the country. After organizing the merger, the Federal
Reserve began lending directly to financial institutions at an average of $31.3 billion a day,
according to Saunders and Cornett (25). The Feds involvement continued even further in
September of 2008 when it seized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Shortly after this acquisition,
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, Merrill Lynch had to be acquired by Bank of America, and
Washington Mutual, the largest savings institution in the country sought a buyer. These events
caused the stock market to free fall with the Dow Jones Industrial Average falling 500 points.
3.3 The Course of the Crisis
With the collapse of the United States stock market, and subsequently the country’s
largest mutual funds, credit markets froze. Not only were banks incapable of lending to
consumers, they were also unable to lend to each other. The London Inter Bank Offering Rate
(LIBOR), the interest rate at which banks lend to each other, skyrocketed as it was no longer
guaranteed that the financial institution borrowing funds could be accountable to pay back their
loans.
To stop the free fall of the economy and unfreeze the credit markets, the United States
government passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program in early October of 2008. The program
allowed for the federal government to use $700 billion to stabilize the economy. About $250
billion of the funds were used as capital injections into financial institutions to decrease the

12
amount of leverage these banks had taken. Another $40 billion went to stabilize AIG and its
increasing insurance commitments. Citigroup, Bank of America, and a group of other financial
institutions received bailouts of $25 billion and $20 billion respectively to take risky loans off
their balance sheets (Saunders and Cornett 27-28). The program not only targeted financial
institutions but it also bailed out the automotive industry with about a $25 billion injection.
The Troubled Asset Relief Program stopped the economic free fall, but the economy
continued to gradually decline into 2009. By January unemployment was close to 8% and the
Gross Domestic Product had declined 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Saunders and Cornett
29).
As the economy began to stagnate, the government passed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. This act was a $308 billion stimulus package aimed at creating jobs through
the expansion of infrastructure/energy related projects and the expansion of unemployment
benefits.
Increases in federal aid continued into February when the government passed the
expansion of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. The goal of this expansion was to
stimulate demand for securities. The government hoped to achieve this through lowering the cost
of purchasing securities to investors. With the increase in demand for securities, originating these
packages would be cheaper for banks and the availability of end consumer credit lines, which is
what these packages were comprised of, would increase. The expansion would also see a
continuation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program through the creation of the Public-Private
Investment Fund which continued to buy risky loans off banks’ balance sheets.
3.4 Recovery and Changes

Towards the end of the spring in 2009 the economy showed distinct signs of making a
recovery. According to Saunders and Cornett, “Home sales rose at an annual rate of 6.1% in
September and were 21.2% ahead of their September 2008 numbers” (34). Accompanying the
increase in home sales, home residential construction saw similar increases.
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These increases in the residential sector were only indicative of larger improvements in
the economy. The GDP in the third and fourth quarter of 2009 rose 2.2% and 5.7% respectively
(Saunders and Cornett 34). This GDP growth suggested a large increase in consumer spending
and a recovery in consumer credit seeking activity. With these systemic improvements in the
economy even the Dow Jones Industrial Average began to rebound significantly.
With the economy in a slow recovery the government took strides to reform financial
market to prevent against another financial crisis. In July 2010, the United States government
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, their solution to
systemic problems of the current financial system. One of the most significant pieces of the act
was the extensive expansion of the Federal Reserve. The Fed could now mandate the break-up of
any financial institution and increase their regulatory oversight to financial institutions other than
banks. Another significant aspect of the act was the increase in capital requirements for all
financial firms. The act also aimed at reducing market opaqueness through the regulation of
securitization markets and credit rating agencies. It even protected end consumers through the
increase in required transparency in consumer products such as mortgages.
The crisis was ultimately caused by an overextension and overutilization of credit by
banks and consumers. It showed the need for increased government regulation and oversight of
financial institution and it also the exemplified the systemic risk that large financial institutions
pose when they participate in depository and investing activities. The impacts of the crisis had
very prominent effects on the activities of financial institutions. However, the impacts of the
crisis could permeate even further, changing the ways these firms emerge from bankruptcy.
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4. Literature Review and Hypothesis
There is a large body of research on the characteristics and financial determinants of
bankruptcy filings and bankruptcy emergence. There also has been extensive research into the
effects of financial crises. This section reviews these research streams and the key findings.
4.1 Bankruptcy Research
In bankruptcy literature, much of the research centers around bankruptcy prediction. In
Altman’s seminal paper from 1968, he uses discriminant analysis to present a five-factor
prediction model, now known as Altman’s Z-score, to predict bankruptcy within two years. The
significant indicators for bankruptcy in his model are: working capital/total assets (liquidity),
retained earnings/total assets (profitability), earnings before interest and taxes/total assets
(operating efficiency), market value of equity/book value of total debt, and sales/total assets
(capital-turnover). Ohlson (1986) reasserts and expands on Altman’s findings, concluding that the
size, structure, performance, and liquidity of a firm are all statistically significant factors of the
probability of bankruptcy. Shumway then drastically expands Altman’s and Ohlson’s findings in
2001 by creating a hazard model for predicting bankruptcy rather using a static model.
Shumway’s findings suggest several ignored variables are strongly correlated with bankruptcy:
the market size of the firm, past stock performance, and the standard deviation of its stock
returns. Another significant finding made by Richardson (1998), shows that the presence of an
economic recession has an impact on which variables serve as predictors of bankruptcy.
Specifically, he finds that current assets to total assets, current ratio, and leverage are significant
predictors of failure if they are observed from periods of economic recession. This differs from
data observed in non-recessionary periods in which income to total assets and cash to total assets
serve as predictors alongside the aforementioned variables.
The significance of this bankruptcy literature, in relation to this project, is that it proves
certain firm-specific variables can be used as indicators for future bankruptcy. It also shows that
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the macroeconomy changes the prediction power of these variables. These findings suggest that
the macroeconomy may have a similar effect on firm-specific variables that serve as indicators
for bankruptcy emergence. This study aims to explore this possibility further.
4.2 Bankruptcy Emergence Research
Prior research on bankruptcy emergence, much like the prior research on future bankruptcy,
focuses on accounting variables that serve as predictors of bankruptcy emergence. However, the
research on bankruptcy is controversial.
White’s seminal theoretical model from 1984, serves as a foundation for most current
emergence research. In his research, White finds that emergence is correlated with a firm’s free
assets, size, earning prospects, and management commitment. Thus, larger firms with more
uncollateralized assets, more earning potential, and more equity invested managers are more
likely to emerge. However, subsequent research by Casey (1986) and Campbell (1996) differ
slightly.
Both proceeding studies reassert that free assets is a significant factor in predicting
bankruptcy emergence but Casey’s (1986) results do not reassert that size is a significant factor.
In terms of earnings potential, Casey (1986) finds that retained earnings, but not profitability, is
correlated with emergence. This differs from Campbell’s (1996) findings that profitability is a
significant emergence indicator. Lastly, neither Casey (1986) or Campbell (1996) found that the
equity investment of managers had any correlation with emergence.
Campbell’s research also expanded on White’s seminal work. Campbell (1996) found
that firms with less secured creditors are more likely to emerge due to lower bankruptcy costs. In
addition, he found that firms in the construction and manufacturing industries are significantly
less likely to emerge.
This existing research is important within the scope of this project because it asserts that
there are significant changes in the emergence indicators across certain samples. The
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controversial findings as well as the significance of the industry show that the characteristics of
the sample plays an integral role in the probability of emergence.
4.3 Financial Crisis Research
Currently, to the best of my knowledge, there is no relevant research that addresses the
2008 financial crisis’ effect on bankruptcy processes and outcomes. In a much more general
scope, the effects of financial crises on the macroeconomy has been researched.
Laeven and Valencia (2008) estimate that gross domestic product declines about 23
percent on average during the first four years after a banking-related financial crisis and 33
percent on average in advanced countries regardless of the type of financial crisis. They also have
found even after the decline in GDP has been adjusted for net recoveries, the cost of a financial
crisis averages about 6.8 percent of GDP. This loss in GDP combined with their finding that the
median public debt increase 12 percent after a financial crisis makes for extremely unattractive
market conditions. Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2009) found that available credit declines 7
percent, housing prices drop 12 percent, and equity prices fall 15 percent after a financial crisis.
Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li (2011) show that these conditions ultimately lead to credit-less
recoveries in one out of every five recoveries. This phenomenon leads to a reduction in
financially dependent activities like investing and firms dependent on external financing fail or
grow much more slowly.
Given the scope of the current literature, the effect of financial crises on firm specific activity,
such as bankruptcy, has gone unexplored. The research shows that financial crises lead to credit
crunches, which in turn would lead to less opportunities for illiquid and insolvent firms to receive
relief from financial distress. This link between financial crises and their effect on credit can be
extrapolated to find correlation between financial crisis events and firm bankruptcy.
4.4 Hypothesis
In White’s seminal research he found that that larger firms with more profitability are
more likely to emerge from bankruptcy than smaller, less profitable firms. Altman and Ohlson
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also found firm structure to be associated with bankruptcy filing. Lastly, Campbell found that
lower bankruptcy costs increase the probability of emergence. Using total assets before
bankruptcy to model size, operating profit margin to measure profitability, solvency— the ability
of firm to meet all its debt obligations—as a measure of overall liquidity and firm structure, as
well as the presence of a prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy as an indicator of lower
bankruptcy costs; I formally hypothesize that:
1) The assets, solvency, and operating profit margin of a firm before bankruptcy
as well as the presence of a prepackaged prenegotiated bankruptcy will be
positively associated with bankruptcy emergence.
Campbell’s, Altman’s, and Ohlson’s research is also the basis for my second hypothesis.
Altman’s and Ohlson’s findings that firm structure is significantly related to bankruptcy filings
suggest that there may be a significant relationship between firm structure and bankruptcy
emergence as well. Moving forward with Campbell’s finding that bankruptcy costs are negatively
related with bankruptcy emergence, and using debt to equity as a measure of a firm’s leverage as
well as the number of days in bankruptcy has an indicator of higher bankruptcy expenses, I
hypothesize that:
2) Days in bankruptcy and debt to equity will be negatively associated with
bankruptcy emergence.
My third and my final hypothesis is largely based off the research of Richardson as well
as Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li. Richardson (1998) found that in times of economic recession firm
structure is more significant of a factor in the probability of bankruptcy as compared to nonrecessionary periods. Accompanied by Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li’s finding that one in five
recoveries are credit-less; this information leads me to hypothesize that:
3) The assets, solvency, and profit margin will be more significantly positively
associated with bankruptcy post crisis as well as debt to equity being more
significantly negatively related to bankruptcy emergence post crisis.
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5. Data and Methodology
For this study, I will be looking at publicly traded financial firms that went bankrupt from
1983 to 2013. The data has been collected from the UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research
Database and has been pared down to a collection of ten variables that are hypothesized to be
significant in realm of bankruptcy emergence. The variables consist of four financial variables
and six non-financial variables. The variables will be tested using a difference-in-means t-test and
a binary logistic regression.
5.1 UCLA LoPucki Database
The UCLA LoPucki Bankrutpcy Research Database is a vast collection of bankruptcy
data. It is comprised of over 200 different variables on about 1000 different bankrupt firms
spanning 37 years.
For a firm to be included in the database it needs to be a large publicly traded company.
For the scope of this database large public firms are defined as firms who have “filed an Annual
Report (form 10-k) with the Securities and Exchange Commission for a year ending not less than
three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case” and “if that Annual Report reported assets
worth $100 million or more, measure in 1980 dollar (about $287 million in current dollars)”
(Lopucki 3). The database includes data stretching back to October 1, 1979 and is updated
monthly with new additions. It only covers bankruptcy cases that are filed under Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 regardless of the filer.
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5.2 Data Organization and Variable Selection
*Table 1 – Summary Table of Variable

Variables
Emerged

Type of Variable
Binary

Assets Before

Continous

Measurement of the Variables
1 for emerged
0 for failure
In millions of U.S. Dollars

Summary
Whether the firm emerged from bankrutpcy

Operating Profit Margin Before

Continous

Expressed as a ratio

The amount of assets held by a firm before
bankruptcy
Operating profit margin before bankruptcy

Days In BK

Discrete

Calendar Days

The number days the firm was in bankruptcy

Solvency Before

Binary

Involuntary BK

Binary

CEO Days Before

Discrete

1 for solvent
0 for insolvent
1 for involuntary
0 for voluntary
Calendary Days

Measurement of a firm's liquidity before
bankruptcy
Whether the firm was forced in to bankruptcy by
their creditors
The tenure of the CEO prior to bankruptcy

PrepackPreNeg

Binary

Ceo Gender

Binary

Whether the bankruptcy was prepackaged or
prenegotiated
The gender of the CEO during bankruptcy

Ceo Replaced During BK

Binary

DE_Ratio

Continous

1 for prepackaged/prenegotiated bankruptcy
0 for not
1 for Male
0 for female
1 for Replaced
0 for Not Replaced
Expressed as a ratio

YearFiled

Discrete

Calendar Year

Year the firm filed for bankruptcy

Whether the CEO was replaced in during the
bankruptcy
Debt to Equity ratio before bankruptcy

Starting with the original data set that I acquired in October of 2016, there was 218
variables for 122 financial companies that went bankrupt between 1983 and 2013. Based on prior
research, I parsed the data for eight specific variables: whether the firm emerged, solvency before
bankruptcy, assets before bankruptcy, operating profit margin before bankruptcy, days in
bankruptcy, whether it was a prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy, the debt to equity ratio
before bankruptcy, and year filed.
Despite not being potential indicator variables the “Emerged” and “Year Filed” variables
were kept as dummy variables for the eventual t- test and binary logit regression. The “Year
Filed” variable was used to create a dummy variable that represented a pre-financial crisis
bankruptcy versus a post financial crisis bankruptcy. Firms who filed bankruptcy prior to 2008

20
were assigned a 0 value to represent pre-financial crisis bankruptcy and firms who filed
bankruptcy in 2008 or thereafter were assigned a value of 1 to represent a post-financial crisis
bankruptcy. This dummy variable was used to separate my data into two populations to run a
difference-in-means t-test. The “emerged” dummy variable (bankruptcy emergence=1 and failure
to emerge from bankruptcy=0) was used in the binary logit regression to model bankruptcy
emergence.
“Solvency Before”, measured as 0 or 1, represents a firm’s ability to meet their long-term
debt obligations before bankruptcy. Simply, this represents whether a firm’s assets total more
than the sum of all its debt. If the company was solvent at the time of their bankruptcy filing
“Solvency Before” would equal 1. If a company was insolvent, “Solvency Before” would equal 0.
This variable represents an indirect measure of liquidity which prior research suggests is
associated with bankruptcy.
“Assets Before”, is the asset value that a firm held on its balance sheet prior to filing
bankruptcy, thus this variable can be used a measurement of a firm’s size. In prior research it was
found that the size of a firm is positively associated with bankruptcy emergence.
Like “Assets Before”, “Operating Profit Margin Before”, which was calculated by
dividing the firm’s operating income by their net sales, serves as a measurement for a firm’s
profitability. This characteristic has been found to be positively associated with bankruptcy
emergence.
Using Campbell’s (1996) findings that variables which are associated with higher
bankruptcy costs are directly associated with bankruptcy emergency, I use “Days In Bankruptcy”
to model this as the variable serves as an indirect measurement of bankruptcy costs.
The variable “Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Bankruptcy” is also included because of its
association with bankruptcy costs. Prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies tend to acquire
less administrative cost and thus should be associated with a greater chance of bankruptcy
emergence.

21
“Debt to Equity” is used as a measurement of a firm’s leverage. Prior research suggests
that firms that are leveraged with more debt tend to be less likely to emerge from bankruptcy.
Along with these variables, I also tested variables that have not been tested in this
literature stream: CEO gender and whether the CEO was replaced during bankruptcy.
Currently CEO related variables are a popular topic in financial research. I decided to test
CEO gender because Khan and Vieto (2013) found that CEO gender is associated with firm
performance. They found that firms with female CEOs have smaller risk levels than firms with
male CEOs. Due to the relationship between risk level and gender there may be by extension a
relationship between gender and bankruptcy emergence.
Whether the CEO was replaced during the bankruptcy process may also hold interesting
results as well. Replacing a CEO can be indicative of a firm’s board bringing in a CEO who
specializes in managing failing firms which would suggest that it would be associated with
bankruptcy emergence. It also can be indicative of the gross mismanagement of a firm prior to
bankruptcy which would suggest it is associated with failure.
The last variable that I chose to test was whether the bankruptcy proceedings were
involuntary. If a firm was a forced into bankruptcy by its creditors this may suggest that there is a
significant level of unpreparedness and thus involuntary bankruptcies may be strongly associated
with bankruptcy emergence.
Using a combination of these variables, I hope to model the probability of bankruptcy
emergence.
5.3 Univariate Analysis
The first statistical analysis I will perform on these variables will be an independentsample difference-in-means t-test. An independent-samples t-test is a form of hypothesis testing
that determines the probability of a statistically significant difference in the means of two
different samples. For the scope of this project the two samples will be Pre-Crisis Bankruptcies
and Post-Crisis Bankruptcies. Since I am trying to show that there is a differences in the means of

22
these samples, the null hypothesis which I will be trying to reject is that the means of the
populations are not statistically different. Ultimately, this test shows whether the difference in the
two groups’ means reflects a “real” difference rather than because the samples were irregular.
To see if two means are statistically different one must first calculate a t-statistic. A tstatistic is simply the difference in the two samples’ means over the variability of the two
samples, also called the standard error of the difference. To calculate the variability, you must
first calculate the variance for each sample then divide it by the number of observations you have
in each sample. Then add these values together and take the square root. The subsequent t-value
represents the difference of the estimated value from its actual observed value. This entire
equation can be expressed as follows:

𝑡=

𝑥̅ 1 −𝑥̅ 2
𝜕

𝜕

√𝑛1 +𝑛2
1

2

Using this t-statistic, one can calculate the significance of this result from a normal t
distribution table using the samples degrees of freedom by calculating the p value. If the p value
is under .05 then one can reject null hypothesis; however, if the p value is over .05 then there is
not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. In terms of this project, if a variable has a pvalue lower than .05 then there is a statistically significant difference in the means of this variable
Pre-Crisis compared to Post-Crisis.
5.4 Multivariate Logistic Regression
The second analysis procedure I will be running on my data is a logistic regression using
emergence as a binary response. For the scope of this project, a logistic regression model
estimates the probability of the emergence (1) or failure of a firm (0) based on one or more
indicator variables. Using the maximum likelihood estimates, a binary logistic regression model
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forms a function that maximizes the probability of a certain outcome by assigning each variable a
specific regression coefficient. Each of these coefficients measures a variables’ involvement in
variations in the dependent variable. Ultimately, a binary logistic regression can be written out
formulaically as:

𝑝=

𝑒 𝑎+𝑏1 𝑥1 +𝑏2 𝑥2 +..
1+𝑒 𝑎+𝑏1 𝑥1 +𝑏2 𝑥2 +..

In this form:
p = the probability of the binary response
e = the base of natural logarithms
a = the intercept of the regression equation
b = the coefficient associated to respective indicator variables.
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6. Results
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Taking the full sample of 122 firms, I first ran a basic descriptive statistical analysis. In
Table 2, I display the results. Any firm that did not have an observation for a variable was
excluded from the means procedure which explains the varying levels of observations in the
“N” column. From this table, I can note a few important characteristics about the data. In the
full sample, a little less than half of the firms emerged from bankruptcy (46.28%) spending an
average of 570.88 days in bankruptcy. Only 7.45% of firms were forced into bankruptcy by
their creditors and 92.56% of firms had male CEOS. Of these firms 45.45% of firms replaced
their CEOs during bankruptcy and only 18.18% of firms entered bankruptcy with
prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy plans. The tenure of a CEO before bankruptcy
was 1337.02 days. On the financial side, the average value of total assets held by firms was
$14.68 billion with most operating at an average loss of $195,820 a year. About 75% of the
firms were solvent at the time of their bankruptcy filing with firms holding about 470% more
debt than equity.
*Table 2-Descripitive Statistics Full Sample

Variable
Emerged
Assets Before
Operating Profit Margin Before
Day In BK
Solvency Before
Involuntary BK
CEO Days Before
PrepackPreNeg
Ceo Gender
Ceo Replaced During BK
DE_Ratio
YearFiled

Full Sample
N Mean
121
0.4628
121 14678.1100
108
-0.1958
121 570.8760
118
0.7458
121
0.0744
121 1337.0200
121
0.1818
121
0.9256
121
0.4545
118
4.7001
121 2000.9300

Median
Standard Deviation
0.0000
0.5007
1377.5300
69770.6300
0.0218
1.3601
457.0000
460.8484
1.0000
0.4373
0.0000
0.2635
298.0000
2185.5900
0.0000
0.3873
1.0000
0.2635
0.0000
0.5000
9.1607
70.8059
2002.0000
8.3484
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When the sample was split into pre-crisis and post-crisis samples, the characteristics of
the sample varied greatly. Only 33% of firms emerged from bankruptcy after the 2008 financial
crisis whereas 53% emerged from bankruptcy prior to the crisis. Firms also spent an average of
597.82 days in bankruptcy pre-crisis as to only 520.19 days post-crisis. Of the post crisis sample,
no firm was forced into bankruptcy by its creditors; however, in the pre-crisis sample about 11%
of the firms went into bankruptcy involuntarily. The average tenure and gender of the CEO was
similar in each sample. Only differing about 64 days and 3% respectively. About 26% more
CEO’s were replaced during bankruptcy pre-crisis compared to post-crisis. The prevalence of
prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies were similar with the average number only differing
by 1%. Financially, the samples differed greatly in size with post-crisis firms holding $26.62
billion more in assets. Both sets of firms operated at a loss prior to bankruptcy with pre-crisis
firms averaging a $80,710 loss and post crisis firms averaging a $366,720 loss. Post-crisis firms
tended to be more solvent with at 83% compared to pre-crisis firms only being solvent 70% of the
time. Firms leverage varied greatly between samples with post-crisis firms holding 970% more
debt than equity and pre-crisis firms only holding 126% more debt than equity.
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*Table 3-Desciptive Statistics Pre-Crisis Sample

Variable
Emerged
Assets Before
Operating Profit Margin Before
Day In BK
Solvency Before
Involuntary BK
CEO Days Before
PrepackPreNeg
Ceo Gender
Ceo Replaced During BK
DE_Ratio
YearFiled

Pre Sample
N Mean
79
0.5316
79 5439.8200
66 -0.0871
79 597.8228
76
0.6974
79
0.1139
79 1314.8100
79
0.4772
79
0.9367
79
0.5443
76
1.2647
79 1996.1400

Median
Standard Deviation
1.0000
0.5022
979.4000
12172.9900
0.0572
1.4463
457.0000
498.9107
1.0000
0.4624
0.0000
0.3197
242.0000
2275.7600
0.0000
0.3843
1.0000
0.2450
1.0000
0.5012
3.3847
81.0190
1997.0000
6.2259

*Table 4-Descriptive Statistics Post-Crisis Sample

Variable
Emerged
Assets Before
Operating Profit Margin Before
Day In BK
Solvency Before
Involuntary BK
CEO Days Before
PrepackPreNeg
Ceo Gender
Ceo Replaced During BK
DE_Ratio
YearFiled

Post Sample
N Mean
42
0.3333
42 32054.8800
42
-0.3667
42 520.1905
42
0.8333
42
0.0000
42 1378.8100
42
0.1905
42
0.9048
42
0.2857
42
10.9166
42 2009.9500

Median
Standard Deviation
0.0000
0.4771
3294.0900
116154.9100
-0.1050
1.2095
434.5000
379.5168
1.0000
0.3772
0.0000
0.0000
638.0000
2031.0900
0.0000
0.3974
1.0000
0.2971
0.0000
0.4572
13.8057
47.3057
2009.5000
1.6223
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6.2 Results of the T-Test
As one can see from the descriptive statistics in Table 3 and Table 4 the means of the
variables differed in each sample. However, not all differences were statistically significant.
Using an independent-sample difference-in-means t-test, variables with a p-value of less than .05
are considered to be significantly different.
There was a statistically significant difference in the number of firms that emerged from
bankruptcy. This finding suggests there are factors or changes in factors present in the pre-crisis
sample that make firms more likely to emerge from bankruptcy as compared to the post-crisis
sample.
There was also a statistically significant difference in the average number of total assets
held by firms, the prevalence of involuntary bankruptcies, and the prevalence of CEO
replacements during bankruptcy.
As for the rest of the variables, the result from Table 5 suggests there is not enough
evidence to prove that there is a true difference in the means of the two samples.
*Table 5-Results of the means T-Test

T-Tests
Variable
Pre Mean Post Mean Difference
Emerge
0.5132
0.3333
0.1983
AssetsBefore
5439.8000 32054.9000 -26615.1000
Operating Profit Margin
-0.0871
-0.3667
0.2797
DaysIn
597.8000 520.2000
77.6323
SolvencyBefore
0.6974
0.8333
-0.1360
Involuntary
0.1139
0.0000
0.1139
CeodaysBefore
1314.8000 1378.8000
-63.9994
PrepackagedPreNeg
0.1772
0.1905
-0.0133
Ceo_Gender
0.9367
0.9048
0.0319
CeoReplacedDuringBK
0.5443
0.2857
0.2586
DE_Ratio
1.2647
10.9166
-9.6519
YearFiled
1996.1000 2010.0000
-13.8131

T-value P value
2.1000 0.0375
-2.0200 0.0453
1.0400 0.2997
0.8800 0.3799
-1.6300 0.1061
2.3000 0.0229
-0.1500 0.8789
-0.1800 0.8586
0.6300 0.5277
2.7800 0.0063
-0.7100 0.4807
-14.1000 0.0001
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6.3 Results of the Binary Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is used to model bankruptcy emergence as well demonstrate the
significance of specific variable contribution to bankruptcy emergence in a multivariate setting.
As shown in Table 6, 7, and 8, I ran five different binary logistic regressions consisting of five
models. I then proceeded to apply these models to the full sample, pre-crisis sample, and postcrisis sample respectively. It is important to note for the interpretation of the results, that the
outcome modeled through these procedures is failure to emerge from bankruptcy. Thus, the
inverse of the direction of the coefficients is true for bankruptcy emergence.
The contributory variables that consist of Model 1 are assets before bankruptcy, days in
bankruptcy, CEO tenure before bankruptcy, CEO gender, CEO replacement during bankruptcy,
and debt to equity ratio. In Model 2, there is the addition of the involuntary bankruptcy variable,
and in Model 3, there is the addition of the involuntary bankruptcy and solvency variable. In
Model 4, I use the same variables as Model 3; however, instead of using the assets before
bankruptcy, I use the logarithm of the assets before bankruptcy. In my last model, I use the same
variables that are present in Model 1 with the addition of operating profit margin variable. The
models were run on the full sample of bankruptcies (Table 6), pre-crisis bankruptcies (Table 7),
and post-crisis bankruptcies (Table 8).
Each of the five models for each of the three respective samples were significant in
modeling bankruptcy emergence as demonstrated by the significance of the Chi-squared test
statistic; however, most of the tested variables lacked any contributory significance.
In the full sample, all fives models were significant in modeling bankruptcy emergence at
the 95% confidence level, but the only two statistically significant variables were CEO
replacement during bankruptcy and days in bankruptcy. These variables were significant across
all five models with CEO replacement being positively associated with bankruptcy emergence
and days in bankruptcy being negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence. Debt to Equity,
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CEO Gender, and the presence of a prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy were also
positively related to bankruptcy emergence; however, their contribution to the outcome was not
deemed statistically significant. It may also be a point of interest to note that debt to equity
changes becomes negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence in Model 5.
(See Table 6 at the end of the section)
In the pre-crisis sample, CEO Replacement, being positively associated with bankruptcy
emergence, was the only significant variable across all five models. Days in bankruptcy, which
was negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence, was significant in every model except
Model 5. This may be due to the decrease in sample size as Model 5 includes operating profit
margin. If a firm did not have an observed operating profit margin calculation they were then
excluded from the model. Subsequently the sample size dropped from 76 to 65.
Some other changes occur in the association of variable to bankruptcy emergence. Debt
to equity is now negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence across all five models. Assets
before also changes its association in all five models, except Model 4, now being positively
associated with bankruptcy emergence.
(See Table 7 at the end of the section)
In the post-crisis sample, all contributory variables, even CEO replacement, lack
statistical significance. Assets before are now negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence
across all five models whereas debt to equity becomes positively associated with emergence
across all five models. CEO tenure which had been negatively associated with bankruptcy
emergence across the previous two samples, now becomes positively associated with bankruptcy
emergence in Models 1 and 2.
(See Table 8 at the end of the section)
The drop in the significance of variables in the post-crisis sample, suggests that firmspecific variables are not relevant in predicting bankruptcy emergence in a post-financial crisis
climate. Where we saw a few firm-specific variables indicative of emergence in the pre-crisis
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sample, the findings from the post-crisis sample allude to systematic and macroeconomic
determinants being the main predictors of bankruptcy emergence.
This conclusion about bankruptcy emergence remains consistent when you think about
the inverse, filing for bankruptcy. In a pre-crisis climate, bankruptcy is an individualized firm
phenomenon. Mostly, when a firm files bankruptcy in a pre-crisis climate it is due to some
characteristic of their own individual operation such as poor management or unbalanced firm
structure. This differs from a post-crisis climate because bankruptcy becomes an industry wide
phenomenon rather than a firm-specific event. Often in a post-financial crisis climate, firms are
filing bankruptcy not due to any fault of their own, but because of the lack of available credit and
lower consumer consumption in the overall market. The difference in the determinants of
bankruptcy filings may be an explanation for the difference in bankruptcy emergence indicators;
however, it must be further researched to come to any concrete conclusion.
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Table 6 – Binary Logistic Regression modeling bankruptcy emergence for the full sample.
Dependent Variable=Emerge(1)/Not Emerge(0)
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Table 7 – Binary Logistic Regression modeling bankruptcy emergence for the pre-crisis sample.
Dependent Variable=Emerge(1)/Not Emerge(0)
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Table 8 – Binary Logistic Regression modeling bankruptcy emergence for the post-crisis sample.
Dependent Variable=Emerge(1)/Not Emerge(0)

33

34

7. Conclusions and Areas for Future Research
In this study, I analyze the relationship between the 2008 financial crisis and bankruptcy
emergence indicators. To perform this analysis, I identified several variables that could
potentially impact a firm’s probability of bankruptcy emergence. In addition, I studied these
relationships before and after the 2008 crisis in both a univariate and multivariate setting.
The findings of this study suggest that the number of days a firm was in bankruptcy and
whether the firm replaced their CEO during bankruptcy were key indicators of the probability of
bankruptcy emergence. These variables were significant predictors in the full sample size as well
as the pre-crisis sample. However, in the post-crisis sample no observed variable was statistically
significant in predicting bankruptcy emergence. Another key finding from this study was that
there was a statistically significant greater number of firms emerging from bankruptcy before the
financial crisis as compared to after the financial crisis.
I correctly hypothesized that the number of days spent in bankruptcy would be negatively
correlated with bankruptcy emergence in the full sample; however, the rest of my findings were
not statistically significant enough to prove my three formally stated hypotheses in their entirety.
The basis for my third hypothesis, that there would be a statistically significant difference in the
probability of bankruptcy emergence in the pre-crisis and post-crisis samples also remained
accurate. However, contrary to the third hypothesis, this difference was not caused by the
proposed variables: assets before bankruptcy, solvency before bankruptcy, operating profit
margin before bankruptcy, and debt to equity before bankruptcy.
One way to improve this study is to increase the sample size. The full sample size of
bankrupt financial firms was large enough to obtain substantial results; however, when divided
into two samples, the statistical power of the regression models and their results were greatly
compromised. If taken further, it may be beneficial to widened the scope of this study to include
more industries, rather than just limiting to the study to the financial sector. Opening the study to
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more industries may yield drastically different results; however, it is important to note that not all
variables can be controlled across multiple industries.
A finding that may warrant future research is the significant difference in the level of
emerging firms in the pre-crisis sample as compared to the post-crisis sample. This would suggest
that there are significant changes in indicator variables across these two populations. These
specific variables just may not have been tested. In this study, only firm specific variables were
analyzed. This finding, accompanied by the decrease in significance of certain indicator variables
in the post-crisis sample, may suggest that the variability in emergence indicators across these
two populations comes from systematic variables rather than firm-specific variables. Ultimately,
this may indicate macroeconomic factors play a more significant role in bankruptcy emergence
than microeconomic and firm specific factors.
Conclusively, this study demonstrates that bankruptcy emergence has a significant
relationship with the number of days in bankruptcy as well as the replacement of the CEO during
bankruptcy in a full sample of bankrupt firms and in a sample of firms who went bankrupt prior
to the financial crisis. The significant difference in the number of firms that emerged from
bankruptcy between the pre-crisis and post-crisis samples, as well as the lack of significant firmspecific indicators of bankruptcy emergence in the post-crisis sample, opens areas of future in the
relationship between macroeconomic variables and bankruptcy emergence. In addition, if the
study was adjusted to include multiple industries there may be further results.
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